University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Max S. Baucus Speeches

Archives and Special Collections

2-5-1992

Conference on U.S.-China Policy, American
Enterprise Institute & U.S.-China Business Council
Max S. Baucus

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/baucus_speeches
Recommended Citation
Baucus, Max S., "Conference on U.S.-China Policy, American Enterprise Institute & U.S.-China Business Council" (February 5, 1992).
Max S. Baucus Speeches. 468.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/baucus_speeches/468

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Archives and Special Collections at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Max S. Baucus Speeches by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information,
please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Printing, Graphics & Direct Mail
ONBASE SYSTEM
Indexing Form

Senator * or Department*:

BAUCUS

Instructions:
Prepare one form for insertion at the beginning of each record series.
Prepare and insert additional forms at points that you want to index.
For example: at the beginning of a new folder, briefing book, topic, project, or date sequence.

Record Type*:

Speeches & Remarks

February-1992

Baucus Blasts China but Argues MFN is Wrong Tool
(select subject from controlled vocabulary, if your office has one)

02/05/1992

CLICK TO PRINT

BAUCUS

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
Call (202) 224-2651

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
February 5, 1992

BAUCUS BLASTS CHINA;
BUT SENATOR ARGUES MFN IS WRONG TOOL

WASHINGTON, DC -- Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) today, criticized the
Chinese Government on trade, human rights, and nuclear and
missile proliferation, but argued that withdrawing Most Favored
Nation trade status is not the tool the U.S. should use to show
disapproval. In the speech Baucus outlined other policy tools
the U.S. can use to address each problem.
Baucus, the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on
International Trade, made the following remarks at the Conference
on U.S.-China policy sponsored by the American Enterprise
Institute and the U.S.-China Business Council.

As most of you are keenly aware, over the last three years,
U.S. relations with China have been the subject of intense
congressional debate. China's violation of basic human rights,
its sales of dangerous weapons, and its unfair trade practices
add up to a reprehensible record.
China has clearly joined a short list of international
renegade nations that includes Libya, Iraq, and Iran.
Quite understandably, there have been frequent calls for
sanctions against China.
ENDS AND MEANS

In my mind, it is unfortunate that the debate on U.S. policy
towards China on recent years has centered on whether or not we
should extend Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status to China.
The heated debate over whether or not Most Favored Nation
status is the appropriate tool for addressing our concerns with
China obscures a broad consensus on the issue.
The Administration and some in Congress -- including myself,
strongly oppose using MFN status as the tool to push for reform
in China.
We oppose conditioning or withdrawing MFN because it would
be exactly the wrong approach. Instead of encouraging reform in
China, withdrawal of MFN would break the growing business ties
between China and the U.S., devastate U.S. export industries, and
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push China further into the hands of hardline Marxists.

A

unilateral cutoff of MFN would hurt the U.S. far more than it
would hurt China -- especially since no other nation would follow
the U.S. example.
But the debate over MFN is a debate over means, not over
ends.
In fact, there is a consensus in the Congress, in the
Administration, in the public, and in the business community that
China's behavior is intolerable and that the U.S. must be a force
for reform. The disagreement is about how we best achieve this
goal, not over whether it is worth achieving.
A NEW CONSENSUS

One of the positive results of last year's congressional
debate over extending MFN is the emergence of the foundations of
a new, consensus policy towards China.
Last July, at the urging of myself and other Senators,

President Bush articulated a comprehensive U.S. policy for
addressing U.S. concerns with China. The essence of this policy
is that the U.S. will pursue carefully tailored policy tools to
win reform in China. At the same time, the U.S. will continue
MFN in order to nurture vital business ties with China. This
policy is often referred to as "constructive engagement."
With this new policy in place for nearly six months and with
the Senate once again moving to consider China's MFN status, it
is appropriate to examine the results on three key issues: 1)
trade, 2) weapons and nuclear proliferation, and 3) human rights.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Under the guise of an austerity campaign launched in 1988,
China
China became the most protectionist nation on earth.
allowed -- in fact, sanctioned -- piracy of U.S. intellectual
property, particularly pharmaceuticals and computer software.
This piracy cost the U.S. close to $1 billion per year in lost
export opportunities.
But the piracy of intellectual property is but the tip of
the iceberg. China has imposed a web of new trade barriers,
including import bans, import licenses, quotas, and
discriminatory testing requirements, to exclude the exports of
the U.S. and other nations.
Not surprisingly, the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with
China ballooned. In 1991, the U.S. trade deficit with China
reached $12 billion -- exceeded only by the U.S. deficit with
Japan.
Last July, the Bush Administration articulated a new trade

policy towards China.

The central premise of this policy was

that if China expected continued access to the U.S. market for
its exports of toys and apparel, it must open its market to U.S.
exports. Two separate unfair trade actions were launched -- one
on intellectual property piracy and one on trade barriers
generally.
The case on intellectual property was successfully resolved
three weeks ago. After the U.S. threatened to block some Chinese
exports to the U.S. unless the piracy ceased, China agreed to

sweeping new patent and copyright protections.

The new agreement

protects U.S. films, computer software, drugs, agrichemicals, and
other products.
Though we must carefully monitor implementation of this
agreement before judging its results, all U.S. intellectual
property industries have hailed the agreement as a major
breakthrough. The agreement is concrete evidence that the U.S.
can win reforms in China if it pursues carefully targeted
policies, rather than cutting off MFN.
But much work remains to be done in the trade area. The
broader unfair trade action on Chinese trade barriers has still
not been resolved. The case was formally launched last October.
Under U.S. trade law, the Administration has a full year to
resolve the case before it is obliged to retaliate against
But I see no reason to wait that
Chinese exports to the U.S.
long. We have been negotiating with the Chinese over these trade
barriers for many months. If an agreement is not reached by late
this spring, the President should retaliate against Chinese
exports to the U.S.
On a related issue, the Administration has promised to stop
allowing China to dictate U.S. policy towards Taiwan. In
particular, the Administration pledged to strongly support
Taiwan's application to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade -- a step that is clearly in the best interest of both the
U.S. and Taiwan.
The Administration has been working behind the scenes to
prepare the way for Taiwan's application. But it is time to now
launch a much more public effort. China cannot be allowed to
dictate U.S. policy towards Taiwan.
WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

For several years, the entire civilized world has shuddered
at reports that China was selling dangerous nuclear and missile
technologies into unstable regions.
Reports of Chinese sales of long range missiles to Syria and

Pakistan and nuclear technology to Iran raised the specter of
nuclear conflict in the Middle East. The western world demanded
that China observe international accords limiting such sales.
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In particular, the U.S. pressed China to sign the Nuclear
Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) -- which regulates sales of

nuclear materials -(MTCR) --

and the Missile Technology Control Regime

which regulates sales of missiles.

The Bush Administration also committed to continue and, if
necessary, expand trade sanctions targeted at China's missile and
nuclear materials industries.
As a result of pressure from the U.S. and other western
nations, China now appears ready to sign the NPT and to abide by
the MTCR.

But China has not finalized its commitment to either
agreement. At his meeting with President Bush last week, Chinese
Premiere Li Peng finally committed to an exchange of letters with
the U.S. formalizing China's agreement to abide by the MTCR.
But until the exchange is completed and reports of Chinese
violations fully investigated, the current sanctions should

remain in place.
HUMAN RIGHTS

I am most disappointed with the progress that China has made
on human rights. We all remember the horrible images of the
massacre in Tiananmen Square.
China has steadfastly refused even a full accounting of its
political prisoners.
The Administration agreed last July to continue sanctions
and employ its diplomatic leverage to win freedom for China's
political prisoners, including those from Tiananmen Square.
In the last few months -- thanks largely to U.S. pressure - we have seen the release of a few political prisoners and a
rough accounting of the fate of most political prisoners.
Hopefully, this is a sign that progress is being made.
make no mistake about it, China has a very long way to go.

But

Until China releases the prisoners of Tiananmen Square, ties
with the U.S. will remain strained. Western business will likely
remain hesitant to invest heavily in China and
Hong Kong until China greatly improves its human rights record.
The only way for China to put the tragedy of Tiananmen
behind it is to release all the Tiananmen prisoners.
The U.S. must continue to put diplomatic pressure on China.
towards that end. This pressure should include continued
opposition to multilateral lending to China.

In blatant violation of U.S. law, China has also exported
goods made by prison labor -the U.S.

including political prisoners -- to

Morally, the U.S. cannot allow itself to in any way support
China's system of political oppression.
Last summer, the President agreed to step up efforts to
block Chinese exports of goods made with prison labor.
These efforts have borne fruit. The Custom's Service has
seized exports apparel, tools, and a number of other products
suspected of being made with prison labor. It has also set up an
office to investigate claims that imported goods may be made with
prison labor. The U.S. is also seeking to negotiate an agreement
with China to end all exports of prison labor goods and allow the
U.S. to make inspections in China to enforce the agreement.
Here again, more remains to be done. But we are making
progress. Hopefully, we can be soon be assured that the U.S.
consumer is not being made an unwitting accomplish to China's
system of political oppression.
CONCLUSION

I hope that the letter that the President sent to Congress
outlining a new policy can provide the basis for a strong
consensus on China policy.
Advocates of employing MFN to address our concerns with
China have done us all a service by drawing attention to China
policy and Senator Mitchell, in particular, deserves praise.
But I fear the continuing debate gives Chinese leaders the
impression that there is support in the U.S. for China and its
policies. There is no support for China's current policies. As
I said at the outset, there is a consensus that China's behavior
must change.
I was very concerned over President Bush's recent meeting
with Li Peng because I feared it further gave the Chinese
leadership the impression that the U.S. was divided in its
assessment of China's policies.
Unfortunately, the Congress seems headed for another round
of debate on MFN for China that may further obscure the
underlying consensus.
Barring some dramatic change, the outcome of this debate
seems clear. The Congress will pass legislation restricting MFN.
The President will veto it. And the veto will be sustained.
Perhaps this exercise is now inevitable.

But once this

debate on MFN is over I hope we can put the issue of MFN behind
us and turn to the real issue: encouraging reform in China.
There is already a basis for consensus. The Administration
has demonstrated a willingness to address the issues that the
advocates of restricting MFN to China have raised.
I hope once the current legislative battle is over we can
build a consensus China policy that we all support instead of
further debating MFN status for China.
That policy should include continuing to engage China
At the same time, we should vigorously use all
through trade.
appropriate policy tools to demand reform in China.
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